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ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
where cross-examination was allowed could not be admitted if the
state was able to secure the presence of the witness at trial, but had
failed to do so. Thus, in Dutton, if Williams had been cross-ex-
amined at a preliminary hearing, his testimony could not have been
introduced at Evans' trial because the state could have secured Wil-
liams' presence at the trial. Yet Dutton allows the admission of
hearsay where there was absolutely no cross-examination of Wil-
liams. The plurality also attempted to distinguish this apparent in-
consistency by saying that Barber involved the use of a paper
transcript, 4 but, as with Brookhart, that distinction is spurious.
It is very difficult at this time to prognosticate the future of Dut-
ton and the right to confrontation. Dutton could become nothing
more than a curious anomaly; but it could just as easily portend a
radically different interpretation of the right to confrontation. If
Dutton is the first case in such a reinterpretation, it poses important
questions for the future. Principal among these are whether the
hearsay-declarant is judged by a different standard than other wit-
nesses, and when tests of reliability and of the estimated weight of
testimony will preclude the right to cross-examination.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE -
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF WELFARE
RECIPIENTS
Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309 (1971).
In the recent case of Wyman v. James,1 the United States Su-
preme Court declared that no search warrant is necessary for state
required home visits by caseworkers to persons receiving benefits
under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children
(AFDC) Program. The case may represent both a curtailment of
the expanding area of welfare rights and a retreat from established
fourth amendment standards.
Mrs. James was a beneficiary under the New York State AFDC
program. State legislation and regulations provided for mandatory
periodic visits by caseworkers to the homes of AFDC beneficiaries
for purposes of reevaluating need in the light of any changed cir-
cumstances. 2 Mrs. James refused to allow such a visit, offering in-
34 400 U.S. at 87.
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stead to provide any necessary and relevant information through
means other than a home visit. Local officials notified Mrs. James
that her continued refusal to permit a visit would result in termina-
tion of benefits. After a pretermination hearing and a second re-
fusal to permit the visit, Mrs. James' benefits were discontinued."
Mrs. James initiated an action in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, alleging the denial by local
welfare officials of her rights under the Constitution.4  A three-judge
district court upheld her claim, awarding declaratory and injunctive
relief.5 The court declared that a home visit constitutes a search
within the ambit of the fourth amendment to the Constitution and,
therefore, when not consented to or authorized by a warrant issued
upon grounds of probable cause violates the beneficiary's right to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. A direct ap-
peal was taken to the United States Supreme Court, which reversed
the findings of the three-judge court.
1400 U.S. 309 (1971).
2 N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAw § 134 (McKinney 1966) provides in part:
The public welfare officials responsible ... for investigating any applica-
tion for public assistance and care, shall maintain close contact with persons
granted public assistance and care .... [Persons receiving assistance shall be
visited] in order that any treatment or service tending to restore such per-
sons to a condition of self-support and to relieve their distress may be rendered
and in order that assistance or care may be given only in such amount and as
long as necessary.
N.Y. POLICIES GOVERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE §
175 provides in part: "Mandatory visits must be made in accordance with law that re-
quires that persons be visited at least once every three months if they are receiving ...
Aid to Dependent Children."
18 N.Y. CODE OF RULES AND REGULATIONS § 351.10 provides in part:
Required Home Visits and Contacts. Social investigation as defined and de-
scribed ... shall be made of each application or reapplication for public assis-
tance or care as the basis for determination of initial eligibility.
a. Determination of initial eligibility shall include contact with the ap-
plicant and at least one home visit which shall be made promptly and in ac-
cordance with agency policy.
Id. § 351.21 provides:
Required Contacts. Contacts with recipients and collateral sources shall be
adequate as to content and frequency and shall include home visits, office
interviews, correspondence, reports on resources and other documentation.
3 No question of procedural due process was raised concerning Mrs. James' pre-
termination hearing. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and Wheeler v.
Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970), the Supreme Court found that due process re-
quired that a pretermination evidentiary hearing be held when public assistance pay-
ments to a welfare recipient are to be discontinued.
4 Mrs. James brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), which creates
a cause of action for the deprivation of constitutional rights under color of law.
5 James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Wyman
v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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In the companion cases of Camara v. Municipal Court" and See
v. City of Seattle,7 decided in 1967, the Supreme Court declared
that the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment barred
the imposition of sanctions for refusal to allow warrantless inspec-
tions by officials of administrative agencies. In Camara, appellant
brought an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent prosecution
under the San Francisco Housing Code for his refusals to allow a
housing inspector to enter his residence. The Court declared that
such an inspection, although for civil purposes, must be governed
by the rule applied to searches for criminal evidence, and that a
prosecution for refusal to allow a warrantless inspection could not
stand.
See v. City of Seattle applied the Camara ruling to routine fire
inspections of nonpublic portions of business premises. The Court
reversed the conviction of a warehouse owner who was prosecuted for
his refusal to allow a warrantless fire inspection of his warehouse.
Once again the Court held that administrative searches for primarily
civil purposes must be governed by the same rule that has been
applied to searches for criminal evidence. A warrant procedure,
the Court said, would serve as a check upon the agency decision
to inspect and would provide the inhabitant with a written state-
ment of the scope and authority of the search being conducted.8
Although both Camara and See held that a warrant must be
obtained prior to administrative searches, the Court in Camara es-
tablished a less rigorous probable cause standard for issuance of such
a warrant than the traditional standard for criminal warrants. The
Court said that a valid public interest would suffice for probable
cause, and implied that in each case a balancing process should be
undertaken in which the need for a particular search is weighed
against the seriousness of the invasion of an individual's privacy.
6 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
7387 U.S. 541 (1967).
8 For excellent discussions of Camara and See, as well as background material in the
area of administrative searches, see Sonnenreich & Pinco, The Inspector Knocks: Admin-
istrative Inspection Warrants Under An Expanded Fourth Amendment, 24 Sw. L.J. 418
(1970); Developments ln the Law - Search and Seizure, 79 HARv. L. REv. 187
(1967); Comment, Search and Seizure - Warrant Requirement for Welfare Searches,
22 S. CAIL L. REV. 241 (1970).
9
"Probable cause" in the traditional criminal context exists where the facts and
drcumstances known to the investigating officer are sufficient to cause a man of reason-
able caution to believe seizable evidence will be found on the premises. See, e.g.,
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See also Comment, Search and Seizure
in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHi. L REv. 664
(1961).
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The Court based its conclusion upon the relatively limited intrusion
involved in civil inspections and the great public interest in the suc-
cessful completion of those inspections.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in James, found
no inconsistency between the present holding and past precedent.
In the first place, he stated that a home visit by caseworkers is not a
"search" within the ambit of the fourth amendment. Mr. Justice
Blackmun observed that although the governing statute and regula-
tions make home visits mandatory,1" the purpose of the visit is not
investigative in the sense of a search within the traditional criminal
law context, and therefore the fourth amendment cannot be invoked.
He noted also that the visit is not forced and that the beneficiary's
denial of permission is not a criminal act. The only repercussion of
a refusal to permit a home visit is that aid will be terminated or will
never begin, as the case may be. No entry is made and no search
takes place.
As an alternative approach to the James question, Mr. Justice
Blackmun asserted that even if the home visit were in fact a search
within the ambit of the fourth amendment, as interpreted in
Camara and See, it is a reasonable one, not violative of the welfare
recipient's fourth amendment rights, and therefore does not require
a search warrant. The majority supported the reasonableness of the
home visit by impliedly relying upon the balancing of important
public policy considerations against infringement of the right of pri-
vacy of a welfare recipient. Mr. Justice Blackmun was unable to
discover any infringement of the right to privacy in James sufficient
to outweight the significant public policy factors favoring home
visits. 1'
Mr. Justice Blackmun distinguished Camara and See upon their
facts. He noted that both cases involved a search for violations and
10 See note 2 supra.
11 Mr. Justice Blackmun cited 11 factors which led him to the conclusion that the
home visit proposed for Mrs. James would have been a reasonable search: (1) the pub-
lic interest in seeing that dependent children are cared for; (2) the public interest in
knowing how public charitable funds are used; (3) the public interest and concern in
seeing and assuring that the intended objects of the tax-produced assistance are the
ones who benefit from it; (4) the legislative concern for close contact between welfare
beneficiaries and agency workers; (5) the public interest in furthering rehabilitative
orientation among recipients; (6) that no specific unreasonable intrusion into privacy was
presented; (7) that agency officials employed reasonable methods in conducting home
visits; (8) the inadequacy of other methods of obtaining necessary information; (9) that
visits are made by trained, sympathetic caseworkers; (10) that the visit is not a criminal
investigation; and (11) the dubious protection offered by warrants issued under a re-
laxed standard of probable cause. 400 U.S. at 318-24.
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a criminal prosecution for refusal to permit entry. In James, he
found that no statute made refusal of entry a criminal offense and
that the only consequence of a refusal is the termination of benefits.
Mr. Justice Blackmun was careful to point out that termination
of benefits upon refusal of a home visit might not be constitution-
ally upheld in all circumstances. He did not elaborate on future
possibilities, but he implied that an early morning mass raid of a
recipient's home might be an example of a situation where a war-
rant would be required.12
The James case was decided over the dissents of Mr. Justice
Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall. Mr. Justice Douglas thought
the primary question in James was whether the receipt of govern-
mental largesse "makes the home of the beneficiary subject to access
by an inspector of the agency of oversight .... .. Mr. Justice Doug-
las' analysis of James equated the home visits by caseworkers with
administrative inspections. Thus, he would hold strictly to the rule
of Camara and See, requiring a proper search warrant. Mr. Justice
Douglas further noted that the intrusions into Mrs. James' home in
this case may even be discriminatory to the extent of offending no-
tions of equal protection since other classes of recipients of govern-
mental largesse are not subjected to such intrusions. He concluded
that: "Isolation is not a constitutional guarantee; but the sanctity
of the sanctuary of the home is such - as marked and defined by
the Fourth Amendment .... What we do today is to depreciate it."'"
Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, also dis-
sented, embracing the contention that James involved a search within
the ambit of the fourth amendment. He sharply criticized the ma-
jority's balancing test, which he viewed as totally ad hoc and subjec-
tive. He noted that a serious civil penalty is involved in James in
the form of termination of benefits,' 5 and that the possibility of a
criminal prosecution arising out of a home visit is ever present.'"
12 Id. at 326. State courts may play an important role in delineating the line be-
tween permissable administrative action and unconstitutional invasions of privacy. For
example, in Parrish v. Civil Service Commission, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1967), warrantless "midnight raids" upon the homes of welfare recipients
were condemned as unjustifiable invasions of privacy.
13 400 U.S. at 327.
14 Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
1 5 Mr. Justice Marshall noted: 'The fact that one purpose of the visit is to provide
evidence which may lead to an elimination of benefits is sufficient to grant appellee
protection since Camara stated that the Fourth Amendment applies to inspections which
can result in only civil violations .... Id. at 340.
16 Welfare fraud is a criminal offense in most states. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. WEL-
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These two factors, according to Mr. Justice Marshall, make Camara
and See directly applicable to the James situation. Accordingly, he
would apply the test enunciated by the Court in those cases. Mr.
Justice Marshall found no possible state interest in James which
could make a home visit a reasonable search.
Mr. Justice Marshall further suggested that the James case could
have been decided without reaching the constitutional questions. He
pointed to a regulation of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, which is binding upon the states participating in the fed-
eral program, and which arguably prohibits unconsented home visits
by welfare workers. The regulation states, in the form of a principle
or objective, that state welfare agencies guard against entering homes
by force or without permission.17
Evident in both dissenting opinions is the feeling that the major-
ity has approved a double constitutional standard based upon the rela-
tive affluence of the recipient of governmental assistance. Both dis-
sents note that businessmen receiving government subsidies would
not be subjected to intrusions such as that in James. Mr. Justice
Douglas stated:
If the welfare recipient was not Barbara James but a prominent,
affluent cotton or wheat farmer receiving benefit payments for not
growing crops, would not the approach be different? . . . [C]on-
stitutional rights - here the privacy of the home - are obviously
not dependent on the poverty or affluence of the beneficiary. It is
the precincts of the home that the Fourth Amendment protects;
and their privacy is as important to the lowly as to the mighty.' 8
Narrowly interpreted, the holding in James simply illustrates
recognition by the Supreme Court that the constitutional doctrine
espoused in Camara and See is not absolute. Such a view has been
evidenced in recent lower court decisions which have narrowly inter-
preted the warrant requirement.' The narrowness of the fact situ-
FARE LAW § 145 (McKinney 1966); OHIo REv. CODE §§ 5107.17, .99 (Page Supp.
1970).
17U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuc. & WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC Assis-
TANCE ADMINISTRATION pt. IV, § 2300(a) (1967). Id. § 2200(a) requires that
states provide plans which protect individual rights and will not result in practices that
violate the individual's privacy or personal dignity, or harass him, or violate his consti-
tutional rights.
18400 U.S. at 332-33.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Sessions, 283 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Ga. 1968); United
States v. Duffy, 282 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Licerio v. State, 456 S.W.2d 96
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Clark v. State, 445 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
For a comment on Clark, see Note, Warrantless Searches of Licensed Businesses, 22
BAYLOR L. REv. 268 (1970). All of the above cases permitted warrantless entries
upon the premises of state-licensed liquor establishments by agents of administrative
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ation in James, coupled with Mr. Justice Blackmun's words of limi-
tation,20 could support the contention that no fundamental change
in the position of the Court on administrative searches has been
made. The Court, according to such an interpretation, has merely
recognized that there are certain exceptions to the warrant require-
ment based upon administrative necessity.
Under a broader interpretation, the James decision could have a
severe impact upon the developing notion that welfare rights are
protected by the due process clause. For example, in Goldberg v.
Kelly,2' the Supreme Court recently held that the due process
clause requires that a welfare recipient be given a pretermination
hearing before his benefits are cut off. The constitutional require-
ment of a proper pretermination hearing carries with it the assump-
tion that there is in fact a right of some sort to receive benefits once
a state has elected to participate in the federal programs.' By char-
acterizing welfare benefits as public charity,23 the James court has
cast doubt on the future significance of due process in American wel-
fare law.
A further question raised by James is what will happen if during
a required and warrantless home visit evidence is discovered which
could be used in connection with prosecution for welfare fraud, a
criminal offense in most states.24  In New York, a caseworker is re-
quired by law to disclose such evidence.25 The majority expressly
refrained from expressing an opinion on the admissibility of incrimi-
nating evidence found during a home visit.26 But if, as the majority
agencies. The courts distinguished Camara and See upon their facts and noted that a
state license invites entry upon the licensed premises for inspection purposes.
2 0 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
21397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2 2 Clearly the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1964), as amended, (Supp.
V, 1970), does not confer upon anyone the unqualified right to receive welfare bene-
fits. No state is required to participate in the federal programs or to provide state aid
of any kind. The Act can, however, be interpreted to create a right in an individual
in a state which has elected to benefit from the federal programs to be considered
for public assistance in accordance with the criteria set up in the Act. See Graham,
A Poor Person's Right to Life, Liberty and Property, 17 WELFARE L BUL. 28 (1969);
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Note, Federal Judicial Review of
State Welfare Practices, 67 CoLum L. REv. 84 (1967).
23400 U.S. at 319.
2 4 See, e.g., statutes cited note 16 supra.
2 5 N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAw § 145 (McKinney 1966) provides in part: "Any per-
son who... by deliberate concealment of any material fact... aids or abets any person
to obtain public assistance ... to which he is not entitled ... shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor ... ..
26400 U.S. at 323.
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